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Court of Appeal Allows Withdrawel of Final Anti-Suit Injunction at Bank’s Request

Illustration Unicredt Ruschemalliance dispute

Introduction

In a decision dated 11 February 2025, the Court of Appeal of England and Wales in case numbers CA-2023-001933 and CA-2023-001933-D, UniCredit Bank GmbH v RusChemAlliance LLC [2025] EWCA Civ 99, considered whether it could vary a final anti-suit injunction after the party that had obtained it asked to give it up.

The court discharged the injunctive parts of its earlier order after UniCredit faced a Russian court order backed by a potential €250 million penalty. It retained the parts recording the English courts’ decisions on jurisdiction. Judgment, paragraphs 1–3 and 42–45

Factual Background

UniCredit, a German bank, and RusChemAlliance LLC (“RCA”), a Russian company, were parties to four performance bonds and three advance payment bonds entered into in August and September 2021. The bonds totalled approximately €453.1 million. They were governed by English law and provided for arbitration in Paris.

The bonds related to agreements RCA had made with two German contractors for the construction of liquefied natural gas and gas processing plants in Russia. The construction contracts were worth approximately €10 billion, of which RCA had paid approximately €2 billion in advance.

Following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, the contractors said they could not perform the contracts or return the advance payments because of EU sanctions. RCA demanded payment under the bonds in October 2022 and April 2023. UniCredit maintained that Article 11 of Council Regulation (EU) No 833/2014 prevented it from paying.

In August 2023, RCA brought proceedings in the Arbitrazh Court of Saint Petersburg and the Leningrad Region. UniCredit sought an English anti-suit injunction to restrain those proceedings. The English Court of Appeal granted a final injunction in January 2024, requiring RCA to discontinue the Russian proceedings and restraining it from pursuing claims or enforcing rulings concerning the bonds outside the agreed arbitration arrangements.

The UK Supreme Court dismissed RCA’s appeal on the question of English jurisdiction in April 2024, giving its reasons in September 2024. The Supreme Court’s appeal concerned jurisdiction; it did not decide the subsequent application to discharge the injunction. Supreme Court judgment, [2024] UKSC 30

The Russian Order and UniCredit’s Application

On 28 December 2024, the St Petersburg court made an order prohibiting UniCredit from commencing or continuing arbitration or court proceedings against RCA outside Russia concerning the bonds. It also required UniCredit to take measures within its control to cancel the effect of the English order. Non-compliance was backed by a €250 million court-imposed penalty.

The Russian order remained under appeal, but the Court of Appeal understood that it had already entered into force in Russia. UniCredit applied to vary or revoke the English order. RCA supported the application.

UniCredit said contempt proceedings against RCA would be unlikely to have practical effect because RCA had no assets outside Russia and its officers did not travel abroad. The bank also maintained that it faced a risk of a substantial penalty if the English injunction remained in place.

The Court of Appeal considered that the Russian order required UniCredit to take steps within its own control, rather than expressly requiring the English court to grant its application. Nevertheless, it found a real risk that the Russian court might impose the penalty if the English injunction remained, because it was uncertain how that court would assess UniCredit’s efforts. The risk was relevant, though not conclusive, to the English court’s decision.

Power to Discharge a Final Injunction

UniCredit relied on Civil Procedure Rule (“CPR”) 3.1(7), which provides that a court’s power to make an order includes a power to vary or revoke it.

The Court of Appeal accepted that finality remains an important consideration. It referred to earlier authorities, including Terry v BCS Corporate Acceptances [2018] EWCA Civ 2422, AIC Ltd v Federal Airports Authority of Nigeria [2022] UKSC 16 and Vodafone Group plc v IPCom GmbH & Co KG [2023] EWCA Civ 113. Those decisions addressed the circumstances in which final orders might be revisited, although the court observed that they arose in different contexts. The parties had not identified an earlier case dealing specifically with the discharge of a final injunction.

The court considered a final anti-suit injunction to be a continuing order with features distinct from a final determination of a completed dispute. In private commercial litigation, it would be unusual if the party that obtained such an injunction could never ask for it to be discharged after circumstances changed. The court also noted that jurisdictional disputes involving competing orders may eventually be resolved or accepted by the parties.

The court held that, in an appropriate case, CPR 3.1(7) permits a final anti-suit injunction to be varied or discharged. It left open whether the separate conditions for reopening a final appeal under CPR 52.30 must always be satisfied when a Court of Appeal order is varied. On the facts before it, the court considered those conditions would be met if they applied.

Giving Up the Injunction and the Arbitration Agreement

The distinction between giving up an injunction and waiving an arbitration agreement was part of the court’s reasoning.

The injunction was an order requiring RCA to refrain from particular conduct. UniCredit, as the party that had sought and obtained that protection, told the court that it no longer wanted or needed it. The court accepted that UniCredit was entitled to make that commercial decision, even though it was acting under substantial pressure from the Russian order.

A separate question was whether UniCredit’s conduct amounted to a waiver of its right to insist on arbitration. The advocate to the court raised the possible effect of such a waiver when discussing the New York Convention. The Court of Appeal observed that parties can waive a right to arbitration and that UniCredit might, in effect, be doing so. UniCredit had not itself advanced that point, and the court did not make a definitive finding that the arbitration agreement had been waived.

The judgment therefore should not be read as establishing that an application to discharge an anti-suit injunction automatically waives the underlying arbitration agreement. The court’s decision was to remove the injunctive relief in the circumstances before it, while preserving the jurisdictional parts of its earlier order.

Commercial Pressure and Public Policy

The court recognised that the Russian order exerted commercial pressure on UniCredit. It nevertheless regarded the bank as a major commercial party capable of deciding where its own interests lay. In the circumstances, the pressure did not weigh heavily against granting the application.

The court also examined possible public policy objections. It emphasised that the Russian order was directed at UniCredit, not at the English court. It did not depart from the policy of giving effect to arbitration agreements, but did not regard the New York Convention considerations as a strong reason to refuse the application.

The court noted that EU Regulation 2024/3192 had introduced a provision concerning recognition and enforcement in EU Member States of certain orders derived from Article 248 of the Russian Arbitration Procedure Code. It also expressly noted that the EU provision did not apply to the United Kingdom. No applicable UK sanctions provision was identified as preventing the requested variation.

RCA’s conduct was another consideration. It had previously indicated that it would comply with the English court’s order, but later acted in contempt of it. The Court of Appeal recorded its disapproval, while concluding that this did not outweigh the other factors, including UniCredit’s exposure to a potentially substantial Russian penalty.

Earlier and Later Decisions

The authorities cited by the Court of Appeal supplied principles on changing final orders, but the court did not identify an earlier case directly deciding whether a final anti-suit injunction could be discharged at the request of the party that obtained it. It also recorded that an interim injunction obtained by Deutsche Bank in related proceedings had already been discharged after Deutsche Bank received permission to discontinue its English claim. An interim injunction, however, is procedurally distinct from UniCredit’s final order.

A later related decision applied the Court of Appeal’s approach. In Bayerische Landesbank and others v RusChemAlliance LLC [2025] EWHC 924 (Comm), the Commercial Court discharged final anti-suit injunctions obtained by three German banks against RCA following Russian orders backed by financial penalties. It retained declarations concerning English jurisdiction and governing law, while revoking certain other declarations and costs orders. That decision followed UniCredit; it was not an earlier precedent.

For a related discussion of competing Russian and European proceedings, see KDB’s article, “Anti-anti suit injunctions – A matter of constitutional law?”, concerning a German court decision in a different gas-supply dispute with an arbitration agreement.


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