Overview
In Fridman v Agrofirma Oniks LLC & Anor , the Court of Appeal (Lewison LJ, Phillips LJ and Sir Launcelot Henderson) addressed a fundamental question of English private international law: can a claimant validly serve proceedings at a defendant’s English residence where the defendant is subject to an indefinite UK travel ban and is legally prohibited from entering the jurisdiction?
Reversing Bryan J in the Commercial Court ([2025] EWHC 300 (Comm)), the Court of Appeal held that service was not valid. Although the claimants had complied with CPR Part 6, the court lacked personal jurisdiction at common law because Mr Fridman was not “present” within England and Wales at the time of service. His indefinite exclusion under the Russia (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019 meant that his absence could not properly be characterised as “temporary”.
The decision is of considerable significance for cross-border litigation strategy, particularly in disputes involving sanctioned individuals or parties subject to immigration restrictions. It reaffirms that service rules under the CPR cannot override the underlying territorial limits of the court’s jurisdiction.
Factual Background
Mr Mikhail Fridman, a Russian-Israeli national, had lived in London since 2013 and acquired Athlone House in Hampstead in 2016 as his residence. He was granted indefinite leave to remain in 2019.
In March 2022, he was designated under the Russia (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019. As a consequence:
- His assets were frozen; and
- He became an “excluded person” under s.8B Immigration Act 1971, losing his leave to remain and being prohibited from entering the UK.
He left the UK on 27 September 2023 and subsequently resided abroad (reportedly in Israel and/or Russia). He remained the beneficial owner of Athlone House, which continued to be staffed and maintained on his behalf.
In February 2024, the claimants issued proceedings and attempted service at Athlone House under CPR 6.9 (service at an individual’s “usual or last known residence”). Various additional steps were taken to effect service, including personal delivery at the property and service at related addresses.
Bryan J held that:
- Mr Fridman remained resident within the jurisdiction despite the travel ban;
- Athlone House was his usual residence; alternatively,
- It was his last known address and reasonable steps had been taken to identify any current address.
Mr Fridman appealed, arguing that because he was legally barred from entering the UK, he was not present within the jurisdiction and therefore not amenable to service as of right.
The Legal Issue
The core issue was whether compliance with CPR Part 6 was sufficient to confer jurisdiction, or whether the common law requirement of “presence” within the jurisdiction remained a substantive prerequisite.
This raised a broader question: is the requirement of presence merely procedural, or is it rooted in substantive principles of international law?
The Court’s Reasoning
1. Presence as a Substantive Jurisdictional Requirement
Lewison LJ conducted an extensive review of the authorities, including:
- Sirdar Gurdyal Singh v Rajah of Faridkote (1894)
- Employers’ Liability Assurance v Sedgwick Collins [1927]
- Airbus v Patel [1999]
- Barclays Bank of Swaziland v Hahn [1989]
The court emphasised that the requirement of presence is grounded in the international law principle of territoriality. As articulated in Adams v Cape Industries:
Protection and subjection are reciprocal.
A person physically present within the territory benefits from its laws and must accept the burden of its jurisdiction. Conversely, a person who is not present and owes no territorial allegiance is not subject to the court’s jurisdiction absent a recognised basis (e.g. service out under established gateways).
The court rejected the argument that the CPR had displaced this principle. Relying on SSL International v TTK LIG Ltd and the presumption against extraterritoriality (endorsed in Masri v CCI), the Court of Appeal held that the CPR must be interpreted consistently with the underlying territorial limits of jurisdiction.
Where earlier authority (notably Kamali v City & Country Properties) suggested otherwise, the court preferred the reasoning in SSL International, holding that presence remains a substantive jurisdictional requirement.
2. Temporary Absence vs Indefinite Exclusion
It is established that temporary absence does not negate presence for jurisdictional purposes. However, the court held that Mr Fridman’s situation was fundamentally different.
Key considerations included:
- His designation under the sanctions regime;
- The cancellation of his leave to remain;
- The indefinite nature of the travel ban;
- The uncertainty surrounding any future ability to re-enter the UK.
While Mr Fridman had expressed an intention to return, the court distinguished between a genuine intention and a mere hope or aspiration. Citing Cunliffe v Goodman, Lewison LJ stressed that one cannot “intend” something that is wholly beyond one’s control.
Given the open-ended and severe nature of the sanctions regime, his exclusion could not realistically be characterised as temporary. There had been a “definite break in the pattern of his life”.
Ownership of property and continued maintenance arrangements at Athlone House were insufficient to establish presence.
Outcome
The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and set aside the order below.
The claimants were advised that, if they wished to pursue proceedings, they would need to:
- Seek permission to serve out of the jurisdiction under CPR 6.36;
- Satisfy one or more of the PD 6B “gateways”; and
- If appropriate, apply for alternative service (potentially at Athlone House).
Practical Implications
This judgment has important consequences for litigators handling disputes involving sanctioned individuals or defendants subject to immigration restrictions.
1. CPR Compliance Is Not Enough
Even strict compliance with CPR 6.9 will not suffice if the defendant is not “present” within the jurisdiction in the substantive sense required by common law.
2. Indefinite Travel Bans Break Jurisdictional Presence
An open-ended exclusion from the UK may amount to a decisive break in residence or presence, even if the defendant retains property and intends to return.
3. Service Out May Be Mandatory
Claimants must carefully assess whether service out under PD 6B is required, particularly where defendants are subject to sanctions regimes. See our analysis of service out of the jurisdiction under CPR 6.36 and the operation of the PD 6B gateways.
4. Sanctions and Civil Procedure Intersect
The case illustrates how sanctions law and immigration status can have direct procedural consequences. For related insights, see our overview of UK Russia sanctions litigation risks.
Concluding Remarks
Fridman v Agrofirma Oniks reasserts a foundational proposition of English private international law: jurisdiction is territorial at its core. The CPR cannot, by implication, extend the reach of the English courts beyond what international law and longstanding doctrine permit.
For defendants under sanctions, the decision provides a significant procedural safeguard. For claimants, it underscores the necessity of rigorous jurisdictional analysis at the outset of proceedings.
In an era of increasing geopolitical litigation, the boundaries of territorial jurisdiction remain as relevant as ever.