In maritime (and all other transport related cases) there is often a chain of contracts (like headcharter-timecharter-subcharter etc.) And when damage is caused, the party who suffered the loss likely has no direct claim against the party that caused it and a chain of disputes is started. So there is a need to align the different disputes to avoid contradicting outcomes.
In a decision dated 15 July 2026, the General Division of the High Court of Singapore in case No 1061 of 2025 ([2026] SGHC 145) rendered a judgment on an application to set aside a maritime arbitration award for alleged breaches of natural justice.
The dispute arose from related time charterparties concerning an offshore support vessel. The decision addressed how two related arbitrations involving different parties could be heard concurrently, while preserving the separateness of each arbitration, each tribunal, and each tribunal’s duty to decide its own case independently.
Factual Background
The vessel was owned by an owner and chartered to the defendant under a head charter. The defendant then sub-chartered the same vessel to the claimant under a separate subcharter. Both charterparties were materially identical and governed by English law. The arbitrations were seated in Singapore and conducted under the Singapore Chamber of Maritime Arbitration Rules in force from 1 January 2022.
The vessel was to be used as an offshore support vessel for works involving a Floating Production Storage and Offloading Vessel, or FPSO. A specialist walk-to-work gangway was installed so workers could move between the vessel and the FPSO. The charter documentation referred to a “walk to work gangway” and a “follow target mode DP facility”.
While the vessel was moored at port, the gangway was connected to the FPSO. The gangway later collided with the FPSO and was damaged. The incident gave rise to disputes over hire, reduced rates of hire, and late redelivery.
The owner commenced arbitration against the defendant under the head charter. This arbitration was referred to as the Head Reference. It was heard by a sole arbitrator, identified in the judgment as [Judge A].
The defendant then commenced arbitration against the claimant under the subcharter. This arbitration was referred to as the Sub-Reference. It was heard by a three-member tribunal consisting of [Judge B], appointed by the claimant; [Judge C], appointed by the defendant; and [Judge D], jointly appointed by [Judge B] and [Judge C] as presiding arbitrator.
The judgment records that all arbitrators in both references were eminent retired English judges. There is no indication that any individual was a member of both tribunals. The Head Reference was before [Judge A] alone, while the Sub-Reference was before [Judges B, C, and D]. The tribunals sat together for concurrent hearings, and inter-tribunal discussions took place, but the tribunal memberships remained separate.
The defendant applied for the arbitrations to be heard concurrently because of the overlap in facts, evidence, and legal issues. The claimant initially objected but later agreed to a concurrency order. This order was the procedural mechanism used to address the involvement of parties who were not formally parties to the other arbitration.
The order did not consolidate the arbitrations. Instead, it allowed the references to proceed together under controlled conditions. Pleadings, applications, orders, disclosure, witness evidence, and expert evidence in one reference were made available to the other relevant party and tribunal. A party from one reference could comment on and respond to evidence applicable to the other reference. At final hearings, all parties could challenge evidence, but they would “not have permission to make submissions” in the reference to which they were not a party. At intermediate hearings, the non-party to that reference could attend and, where applicable, cross-examine evidence, but could not otherwise participate unless permitted by the tribunals.
The two references therefore proceeded concurrently, but remained separate. Separate awards were issued. The head award was issued first, and the sub-reference award followed nine days later. The tribunal in the Sub-Reference stated that it had read the draft Head Award, but had exercised separate and independent judgment.
Legal Considerations
The claimant applied to set aside the second partial final award in the Sub-Reference under section 24(b) of the International Arbitration Act 1994, alleging breach of natural justice.
The claimant’s complaint was not directed at the fact that the arbitrations had been heard concurrently. It also did not complain about the occurrence of inter-tribunal discussions as such. The complaint was directed at the process by which the Sub-Reference award had been prepared.
The claimant argued that the Sub-Reference award was so similar to the Head Award that a fair-minded and informed observer would reasonably suspect that the Sub-Reference tribunal had prejudged the matter or approached it with a closed mind. The claimant alleged that 108 out of 211 paragraphs of the Sub-Reference award consisted of wholesale or substantial reproductions from the Head Award. According to the claimant, the copied material was not limited to procedural history or uncontroversial background, but extended to findings of fact, legal analysis, and reasoning on contested issues.
The claimant also relied on the short interval between the two awards and the tribunal’s express acknowledgment that it had read the draft Head Award. It submitted that the Sub-Reference tribunal had effectively used the Head Award as a template.
The claimant further argued that the fair hearing rule had been breached because the tribunal had decided the Sub-Reference on a basis not contemplated by the parties, without giving them an opportunity to make submissions on the impact of the Head Award. Following further submissions invited by the court after Public Prosecutor v Pek Lian Guan [2026] 3 SLR 1109, the claimant also argued that the tribunal had failed properly to apply its mind to the issues, arguments, and evidence in the Sub-Reference.
The defendant denied any breach of natural justice. It argued that the similarities between the awards had to be viewed in light of the concurrency order, the common evidence, the overlapping legal issues, and the fact that both tribunals had heard the arguments together. It also argued that the claimant had waived its right to object because it had agreed to the concurrency order and had not objected to inter-tribunal discussions during the arbitration.
The High Court rejected the setting-aside application.
On the issue of third party involvement, the court treated the concurrency order as central. The order allowed controlled participation by the owner and claimant in the other reference, but only within defined limits. The court emphasised that concurrent hearings are not the same as consolidation. The arbitrations remained separate, the tribunals remained separate, and each tribunal had to consider the issues before it independently.
The court observed that concurrent arbitrations are not objectionable in themselves, but natural justice issues can arise if appropriate procedural safeguards are not put in place. An agreement to hear arbitrations concurrently, even with inter-tribunal communications or discussions, does not amount to a consolidation of proceedings or a merging of tribunals. Parties remain entitled to expect that each tribunal will consider the issues before it independently and issue an award reflecting its own reasons.
The court then considered whether the similarities between the two awards showed apparent bias. It accepted that there were substantial similarities, but held that their extent and effect had been overstated. Much of the copied material concerned undisputed background facts, the shared chronology, or descriptive material about evidence common to both references. Because both arbitrations arose from the same vessel, the same incident, and materially identical charterparty terms, some overlap was expected.
The court also examined the legal issues on which the awards overlapped. These included the reduced hire issue under clause 44.1, the standby rate issue, and late redelivery. The court found that the tribunal in the Sub-Reference had shown awareness of differences between the two references, addressed arguments specific to the Sub-Reference, and in some places reached conclusions that were not identical to those in the Head Award.
On the claimant’s fair hearing argument, the court held that the tribunal had not impermissibly relied on extraneous material. This case differed from one where an arbitrator relies on materials from a separate arbitration that the parties could not access or address. Here, the references were heard concurrently; the parties and tribunals had access to the same evidence and arguments; and some exchange of views between tribunals was within the parties’ contemplation under the concurrency order.
The court held that the Head Award was not extraneous in the relevant sense. The real question was whether the Sub-Reference tribunal had relied on it so heavily that it could not be said to have exercised independent judgment. On the facts, the court found that it had exercised independent judgment.
The court also rejected the waiver argument. The claimant had agreed to concurrent hearings and had not objected to inter-tribunal discussions, but its complaint concerned the drafting of the award. That complaint only crystallised after the award was issued and the claimant could compare it with the Head Award. The claimant had therefore not waived its right to object on the ground of apparent bias.
The application to set aside the award was dismissed. Costs directions were to be given separately.
