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General Court Partially Annuls Withdrawal of Russian Maritime Register of Shipping’s EU Recognition

Illustration of ship inspection

Introduction

In a decision dated 4 November 2026, the General Court of the European Union in case number T-535/24 (Russian Maritime Register of Shipping v Council of the European Union, ECLI:EU:T:2026:725) rendered a judgment on restrictive measures imposed on a Russian ship classification society.

The Court annulled the withdrawal of the organisation’s EU recognition under Regulation (EC) No 391/2009, finding that the Council could have suspended recognition instead. It dismissed the remainder of the action, partly as inadmissible and partly as unfounded. The Court maintained the effects of the annulled provision for a limited period.

Background and Facts

The Russian Maritime Register of Shipping is a non-profit organisation established in Saint Petersburg and wholly owned by the Russian State. It carries out ship classification, inspection and certification activities for vessels flying Russian and non-Russian flags.

The organisation had been recognised at EU level since 1998. Under Regulation No 391/2009, EU recognition allowed Member States to authorise it to conduct inspections, surveys and certification work on their behalf for ships flying their flags. It was also a member of the International Association of Classification Societies until its exclusion on 11 March 2022.

Following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, the Council adopted further restrictive measures against Russia. The measures concerning the Russian Maritime Register of Shipping included:

  • An investment ban, introduced in March 2022, restricting dealings in certain securities and money-market instruments issued by listed Russian State-owned entities.
  • A transaction ban, introduced in October 2022, prohibiting transactions with the organisation and restricting the provision of economically valuable benefits to it.
  • The withdrawal of EU recognition under Regulation No 391/2009 and Directive (EU) 2016/1629, accompanied by requirements for Member States to withdraw certain authorisations and certificates.
  • A ban on access to EU ports and locks for vessels certified by the organisation, applicable after 8 April 2023, subject to specified exceptions.

The organisation requested access to the information underlying the measures and asked the Council to reconsider them. The Council maintained the measures. The applicant then challenged the relevant provisions of Council Decision 2014/512/CFSP and Council Regulation (EU) No 833/2014, including subsequent acts extending or amending them.

The European Commission intervened in support of the Council.

Scope of the Court’s Decision

The applicant’s case was successful only in relation to one part of the recognition withdrawal. The Court annulled Article 1ab(3) of Decision 2014/512, as amended and extended by the contested decisions, insofar as it withdrew recognition granted under Regulation No 391/2009.

The Court did not annul the investment ban or transaction ban. It also did not annul the withdrawal of recognition under Directive 2016/1629: the applicant had not advanced arguments specifically concerning that recognition in the relevant part of its proportionality plea.

The Court rejected the applicant’s challenge to the corresponding provisions of Regulation No 833/2014 as inadmissible. It likewise rejected the challenge to the port and lock access ban as inadmissible because the applicant was not directly concerned by that ban for the purposes of standing.

Legal Considerations

The successful challenge: withdrawal of recognition was disproportionate

The applicant argued that the Council could have suspended its recognition under Regulation No 391/2009 rather than withdrawing it. The Court agreed that suspension was a less onerous measure capable of pursuing the Council’s objective.

The Council’s stated objective was to increase pressure on Russia to end its actions destabilising Ukraine. The Court held that suspension, like withdrawal, could prevent the applicant from performing inspection, survey and certification tasks reserved to EU-recognised organisations for ships flying the flag of a Member State.

The Court also considered the different consequences of suspension and withdrawal. Restrictive measures are precautionary and temporary in nature and remain valid only while the circumstances justifying them continue and their maintenance remains necessary.

If recognition is withdrawn, lifting the sanctions would not automatically restore it. Under Regulation No 391/2009, a Member State must initiate a new recognition request, after which the Commission assesses the organisation. The applicant itself has no right to initiate that procedure and no right to have recognition granted. By contrast, suspension would not require the applicant to start a new recognition procedure from the beginning, although checks could still be necessary before the suspension was lifted.

The Council and Commission argued that Regulation No 391/2009 provides for withdrawal, but not suspension, and that lifting a suspension could create maritime safety risks. The Court observed that the Council had acted under its common foreign and security policy powers, pursuing sanctions objectives rather than the maritime safety objectives of Regulation No 391/2009. The Commission would remain responsible for ensuring compliance with the regulation’s safety criteria. The Court also found that the alleged safety risks associated with suspension had not been established.

On that basis, the Court upheld this part of the proportionality plea and annulled the withdrawal of recognition under Regulation No 391/2009. It rejected the remainder of the relevant proportionality arguments concerning the investment and transaction bans.

The Council had competence to withdraw recognition

Although the applicant succeeded on proportionality, its separate challenge to the Council’s competence failed.

The applicant argued that Article 7(3) of Regulation No 391/2009 assigns the withdrawal of recognition to the Commission under a prescribed procedure. In its view, the Council had improperly departed from that procedure.

The Court distinguished the objectives of the two legal regimes. Withdrawal under Regulation No 391/2009 concerns compliance with maritime safety and environmental protection requirements. The Council’s withdrawal under Decision 2014/512 pursued a different objective: exerting pressure on Russia in the context of the war against Ukraine.

The Court held that the Council could act under Article 29 of the Treaty on European Union in pursuit of common foreign and security policy objectives, notwithstanding the Commission’s separate powers under Regulation No 391/2009. It therefore rejected the competence plea.

The applicant also argued that withdrawal infringed international maritime conventions. The Court rejected that argument as inadmissible because it had not been raised in the application in support of the relevant plea.

The investment and transaction bans were not manifestly inappropriate

The applicant contended that the measures could not achieve their stated objective because it was a non-profit organisation, did not distribute profits to the Russian State and did not provide significant financial resources to fund the war.

The Court held that the Council had broad discretion when adopting restrictive measures involving complex political, economic and social assessments. The Council did not have to prove that the measures had already produced their intended effect; it was sufficient that they were capable of contributing to that effect.

The measures were imposed because the applicant was wholly owned by the Russian State, not because the Council had established that it directly financed or participated in Russia’s actions in Ukraine. The absence of such direct support therefore did not make the measures manifestly inappropriate.

Proposed exemptions and maritime safety arguments

The applicant proposed several less restrictive alternatives, including exemptions for its EU subsidiaries and for services connected with the certification of maritime equipment, shipyards and repairs.

The Court considered that excluding subsidiaries could allow the transaction ban to be circumvented. It also found that the applicant had not established that a workable distinction between its services could be implemented as proposed.

The applicant argued that vessels certified by it might be unable to obtain necessary assistance or repairs in the EU without its involvement. The Court noted that the port and lock ban contained exceptions for vessels seeking a place of refuge, emergency port calls for maritime safety and saving life at sea. It found that the applicant had not established that other EU operators could not provide the necessary assistance. At the hearing, the applicant referred to approximately 15 incidents involving vessels it had certified, but did not refute the Commission’s statement that those vessels had received assistance.

The Court also examined the applicant’s references to International Maritime Organization survey guidelines and its own technical supervision rules. It found that the applicant had not substantiated its claim that its representative necessarily had to participate in every relevant survey or repair. Its internal rules also contemplated technical supervision by another classification society in certain circumstances.

Environmental protection and freedom to conduct a business

The applicant argued that the measures endangered maritime safety and the environment and interfered disproportionately with its freedom to conduct a business.

As regards environmental protection, the Court found that the applicant had not provided specific evidence establishing a link between the investment and transaction bans and the alleged risks of maritime pollution. It rejected the arguments based on the environmental provisions and principles invoked by the applicant.

As regards freedom to conduct a business under Article 16 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, the Court accepted that restrictive measures can have serious commercial consequences. It nevertheless found that the investment and transaction bans pursued an EU objective of general interest, were subject to review, and were temporary and reversible. The Court also noted that the applicant could continue activities with non-EU States and operators outside the EU.

Reasons, defence rights and judicial protection

The applicant argued that the Council had not adequately explained why the measures applied to it and had failed to respect its rights of defence and effective judicial protection.

The Court found the reasons sufficiently clear. Read together, the relevant provisions and recitals identified the applicant’s status as an organisation wholly owned by the Russian State and explained the connection between that status, the transaction ban and the withdrawal of recognition.

The Court also held that the Council had not relied on new evidence when extending the measures. In those circumstances, it was not required to hear the applicant before each extension. The applicant had not shown that the outcome might have differed had it been heard beforehand.

The Court distinguished the sectoral measures in this case from individual restrictive measures based on criteria requiring evidence of a person’s specific support for a regime. Here, the applicant fell within the measures because of its undisputed ownership, and the Council was not required to establish a separate evidential link between the applicant and the situation in Ukraine.

The Council’s review of the measures

The applicant maintained that the Council had failed properly to consider its observations when reviewing the measures, particularly because the Council referred to its court submissions in its response.

The Court rejected that plea. It found that the Council had responded to the applicant’s main arguments and stated that it had considered the information submitted. The Council was not required to accept the applicant’s position or answer every observation in detail. Given that the reconsideration request repeated arguments already made in the proceedings, the Council could refer to its pleadings without thereby failing to review the applicant’s situation.

Claims Rejected as Inadmissible

The challenge to Regulation No 833/2014

The applicant had not challenged the 2022 regulations introducing the disputed measures within the applicable time limit. It argued that each extension of Decision 2014/512 also extended Regulation No 833/2014 and restarted the period for bringing an action.

The Court disagreed. Although the decision and regulation are closely connected, they are distinct legal acts. The decision has a limited period of application and requires renewal; the regulation does not contain an equivalent expiry provision. Extending the decision therefore did not itself extend the regulation or restart the time limit for challenging it.

The later attempt to amend the action to include Regulation 2025/1494 was also inadmissible because the original challenge to the relevant regulation provisions had been inadmissible.

Accordingly, the Court did not annul Article 5aa(4) of Regulation No 833/2014, which reproduces the withdrawal of recognition.

The port and lock access ban

The Court also found that the applicant lacked standing to challenge Article 4ha(1a) of Decision 2014/512.

Although the provision identified vessels by reference to certification by the applicant, the Court held that it directly affected the legal position of the vessels, whose access to EU ports and locks was restricted, rather than the applicant’s own legal position. The provision did not itself prohibit the applicant from certifying ships.

A potential reduction in demand for its services was, in the Court’s assessment, an indirect economic consequence arising from customers’ choices. The fact that the applicant was named in the provision did not by itself establish that it was directly concerned.

The Court therefore did not decide the applicant’s direct challenge to the port and lock access ban on the merits.

For a separate discussion of judicial review of EU sanctions before the General Court, see Judicial Review of EU Sanctions Before the General Court: Alfa-Bank v Council.

Temporal Effects and Costs

The Court maintained the effects of the annulled part of Article 1ab(3) for a period not exceeding two months and ten days from the date of judgment. It did so because the corresponding provision of Regulation No 833/2014 remained in force: immediately removing the decision provision while an identical regulation provision remained could seriously jeopardise legal certainty.

The Court ordered the Russian Maritime Register of Shipping and the Council to bear their own costs. The Commission, as intervener, was also ordered to bear its own costs.

KDB.legal Koch Boës advises on all aspects of martime law, including effects of sanctions.


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